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Federal regulation
should complement,
not contradict, the market forces
working to
promote safety

Marl<et incentives
for safety

W. Kip Viscusi

In the heated atmosphere
generated by inch-high
headlines and multimil
lion-dollar liability suits,
two important facts often
get lost. First, society's
awareness of what ensur
ing reasonably complete
safety would cost rarely
matches the intensity of its
demands for such assur
ance. And second, the most
powerful forces working to
make products and work
places safer are not the
edicts of government but
the dynamics of the mar
ket. 1tue, there are situa
tions in which the market
cannot by itself create effec
tive incentives for safety,
but in the vast ma;ority
of cases it can-and does.
Drawing on his extensive
research into the regula
tion of risk, the author
both describes the nature
and extent of those incen
tives and offers guidelines
for identifying the kinds of
situation in which they are
not likely to operate. For
these instances, where fed
eral regulation is essential,
the author strongly recom
mends modes of govern
ment involvement that try
to duplicate or extend the
market mechanism.

Mr. Viscusi is professor of
business administration,
economics, and law at
Duke University's Fuqua
School of Business and di
rector of its Center for the
Study of Business Regula
tion. He is the author of

Risk by Choice: Regulating
Health and Safety in the
Workplace (Harvard Uni
versity Press, 1983).

For some time now, government's ap
proach to the regulation of product and process safety
has been absolutist and inflexible. Once it identifies a
hazard, government usually declares that it is harmful,
decides it should be eliminated, and then establishes
technology-based standards to cut the perceived safety
risk to the lowest possible level. Although meant to
promote a no-risk society; this approach has led to
much regulation that is unworkable.
In some instances, the ill-conceived na
ture of these regulations has been obvious all along.
Remember, for example, OSHA's early efforts to regu
late the shape of toilet seats and to require that work
ers on bridges wear life jackets even in cases where the
riverbeds below were dry. In others, well-intended ac
tions produced unintended results. Clothing manufac
turers used the chemical Tris to comply with nonflam
mability requirements for children's sleepwear; only
later did scientific evidence indicate that Tris is poten
tially carcinogenic.
T he point, of course, is not that most
safety regulation is so inadequate and misguided or
that government has no proper role in promoting
safety. T he point is rather that without a clear under
standing of how market forces place a value on risk
and help to reduce it, neither government nor industry
can make socially desirable choices-and make them
work.
Even the most diehard critics of OSHA
would not question the need for government regula
tion to, say; limit the cancer risks posed by a catastro
phe at a nuclear power plant. Where markets are im
perfect, a federal presence may indeed be necessary. In
practice, however, the real problem has not been to find
a legitimate rationale for such regulation but to bal
ance stringency with effectiveness in setting regula
tory policy.
When the Environmental Protection
Agency began to control air pollution, it imposed an
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emissions standard on each point source of pollution.
By forcing companies to invest in control measures for
each smokestack in a plant, it prevented managers
from concentrating their resources in the most cost
effective manner. More recently, the EPA's "bubble"
policy has allowed managers to treat an entire plant as
a single pollution source and, as a result, to put their ef
forts where they will do the most good.1
Regulatory approaches that permit such
trade-offs remain the exception, however. Most health
and safety regulations still hinge on narrowly defined
engineering requirements and performance criteria.
Why? The answer is clear: these efforts reflect a funda
mental mistrust of the market and an unwillingness to
use the many powerful incentives for safety generated
by the decisions of workers, consumers, and companies.

of these future generations can be fairly and fully repre
sented in market decisions about tolerable levels of
risk.
Usually, of course, real transactions do
take place and do meet the necessary criteria. It is, for
example, relatively easy to monitor the risks associat
ed with construction work or work in a sawmill, and
individuals can be expected to make well-informed
choices about the risks they are willing to incur. In
deed, since the time of Adam Smith, economists have
observed that workers will demand extra pay or some
other kind of compensation in return for taking on par
ticular kinds and levels of risk.

How markets promote
safety
In most cases, market decisions will
lead to efficient levels of safety if: (1) adequate informa
tion about risks is readily available, (2) individuals are
aware of the risks they face, and (3) the risks they incur
are the result of their own voluntary and informed
decisions.
T hese conditions do not always exist,
nor does the market always give companies a financial
incentive to promote safety. A manufacturer that
dumps its toxic wastes near a municipal water supply
creates a potential threat to public safety that purchas
ers of the company's products are unlikely to experi
ence directly. Hence they will be unwilling voluntarily
to pay the higher prices needed to offset a safer waste
disposal plan. Similarly, the chemical EDB may pose a
risk to consumers of grain products. If, however, con
sumers are unable to monitor EDB levels, the market
mechanisms for promoting safety will not and cannot
be effective.
For the market to do an adequate job of
regulating safety, all three of the criteria previously
mentioned must be satisfied: availability of informa
tion, awareness of risks, and voluntary choice to incur
the risks. Market transactions that fail to meet these
criteria-as, say, in the case of EDB, air pollution, toxic
wastes, or nuclear power- leave room for the appropri
ate intervention of government.
In more extreme cases, for example,
there are no transactions to speak of at all. Think, for
example, of the genetic damage that the workplace ex
posure of pregnant women to lead or other toxic sub
stances could cause to the unborn and to children not
yet conceived. There is no way the rights and concerns

Wage premiums
At times, labor contracts specify these
forms of special compensation. Elephant handlers at
the Philadelphia Zoo, for example, receive an annual
wage premium of $1,000 because elephants pose a
greater risk for handlers than do other animals. In the
typical case, wage premiums grow out of job evalua
tion systems and are not explicitly detailed in collec
tive bargaining agreements. As a result, the only way to
estimate the general magnitude of these premiums is
to use statistical techniques to analyze large sets of na
tional survey data on employment patterns. My re
search suggests that, on average, U.S. workers receive
just under $1,000 a year for the risks they face.
These premiums reflect both the value
workers attach to their safety and the degree to which
they will accept trade-offs between dollars and per
ceived risk. This value, in tum, reflects the implicit fi
nancial value workers place on their lives in the face of
a known statistical probability of injury or death. A
$1,000 premium in a situation where the risk of death
is 1 in 1,000 implies a value of life equal to $1,000 di
vided by 1/1,000, or $1 million. In practice, for workers
in high-risk jobs, which pose an average risk of death of
1 in 1,000 each year, the implicit value on each statisti
cal life is roughly $600,000. For blue-collar workers in
jobs where the risk of death is 1 in 10,000 each year, the
figure is close to $3 million. For individuals in very
safe occupations, the statistical value per life can be as
much as $6 million to $10 million.
Exhibit I summarizes the contribution
of these risk premiums to the wage costs of manufac
turing industries. On average, these premiums account
for some 6% of production workers' earnings. In rela
tively safe industries such as chemicals, these costs
may fall as low as 3% of earnings, but in industries like
lumber and wood products, they rise to 15 % . Along
1 See William Drayton,
''Getting Smarter About Regulation,''
HBR fuly-August 1981, p. 38.
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with absenteeism and turnover rates, these premiums
can provide managers with a useful barometer of how
workers perceive-and feel about-the safety risks in
herent in their jobs. Equally important, the premiums
give managers strong financial incentives to keep risk
levels within reasonable limits. After all, each year
industry spends an additional $ 70 billion on higher
wages related to risk, not counting workers' compensa
tion benefits, which add an extra $10 billion.

The force of the market
Compared with these stiff market
driven costs, including the implicit threat of legal ac
tion, the financial threat posed by OSHA penalties and
the like are not very significant. True, the threat of an
OSHA inspection has practical effects, particularly on
companies facing an escalating schedule of penalties if
they fail to make the mandated changes. Even so, total
OSHA penalties for violations of health and safety
standards were just over the $6 million level in 1983.
The financial incentives for safety that the market
created during that period were more than 10,000
times as great. Even highly publicized accidents like
the collapse of a cooling tower under construction in
West Virginia, which took 51 lives, do not necessarily
lead to a huge regulatory penalty. OSHA's fine in the
West Virginia case: $108,000.
It is, then, the forces of the marketplace
itself, not government regulations, that provide the
principal financial incentive to promote safety. As
noted previously, these forces work best when safety
risks are readily apparent and generate the kinds of ac
cidents that are easy to tally and monitor. Dimly un
derstood health risks with long-deferred effects that af
fect less aware constituencies are much less suited to
the market mechanism. They are, instead, best dealt
with through government regulations that alter the in
centives of market participants.
Of course, some government actions
for example, the Consumer Product Safety Commis
sion's recent regulation of lawn mowers-needlessly
address risks that the market can handle effectively.
Based on the commission's own calculations, the bene
fits of improved foot probe guards and a "deadman"
control device requiring continuous contact with the
mower handle are not worth the regulation's $200 mil
lion annual cost.
To be sure, the market may fail if partic
ipants do not read the signals that risk generates. Com
panies will often, for example, devote considerably
greater attention to the well-publicized costs of prod
uct liability lawsuits, which average only $225,000 per
fatality, than to the risk premiums generated through
wages and prices, which are an order of magnitude
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larger but have no explicit price tag associated with
them. This emphasis on product liability instead of on
market valuation of safety led the Ford Motor Compa
ny to place a statistical value on lives lost through gas
tank explosions in the Pinto at $200,000 each and, as a
result, to conclude that safety improvements were not
worthwhile.
Better understanding of how consumers
value safety should lead to better safety-related deci
sions. Nevertheless, there will always be situations in
which consumers do not fully understand risks, com
panies do not see how the cost of risk may affect them,
or the risks themselves operate outside the market-as
in, say, the case of pollution. Hence there will continue
to be a long-term role for government regulations that
complement-but do not contravene-the role of mar
ket forces.

Tamper-resistant
packaging
One of the most striking recent exam
ples of how the market works to promote safety is
tamper-resistant packaging. After seven Chicago area
residents died from taking Extra-Strength Tylenol cap
sules that had been poisoned, the Food and Drug Ad
ministration issued extensive packaging requirements
for over-the-counter drugs and cosmetics. Even in the
absence of government action, it seems likely that
companies would have made some such changes in
packaging, but risk levels were sufficiently small that
consumers might not have had enough information to
make sound decisions. In addition, by helping to estab
lish a benchmark for reasonable protective actions, the
regulation reduced the threat of product liability law
suits. On balance, then, was the regulation worthwhile?
The answer depends, of course, on the
assessment of overall costs and effects. At the least, a
regulation should be in society's best interests and/or
its benefits should exceed its costs. That the Office of
Management and Budget now requires this test for all
new regulations ( except when the agency's legislation
prohibits the test) is, in effect, the government's way of
asking whether the regulation would pass a market
test if consumers fully understood the risk. That is, if
they fully understood their benefits, would consumers
be willing to pay the cost of putting better seals on con
tainers sold over the counter?
On the cost side of the equation, the
Food and Drug Administration estimated that the new
packaging requirements would affect nearly 2 billion
containers a year. At 1 cent to 2 cents per container, the
total bill would be approximately $31 million. Thus, if
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the Chicago poisonings were otherwise an annual
event, the regulation would save lives at a cost of $4.4
million per life-a figure roughly comparable to the av
erage statistical value of life for workers in hazardous
jobs.
These calculations do not offer grounds
for a clear-cut endorsement or rejection of the FDA's
policy. The expense of protecting such packages is not
wildly inappropriate, nor is this policy's goal so desir
able that it would be attractive even if it cost more or
were a bit less effective in preserving life. In practice,
the real benefits of the FDA's response have grown out
of the speed with which it has acted. Without the
quick establishment of guidelines for protective pack
aging, affected companies would have had to defer im
provements or risk adopting systems in conflict with
what the FDA ultimately required.
For consumers, the speedy action did
much to alleviate anxieties that distorted their market
preferences, but these distortions showed the true
force of the market in creating incentives for safety. In
the aftermath of the tampering incidents, Tylenol lost
87% of its sales. The sheer size of this response dwarfed
any incentives for safety that the tort liability system
created. Had the seven deaths resulted from its negli
gence rather than from tamperings, Johnson & Johnson
would have faced much smaller financial penalties
than those the market generated. If we can judge from
the typical product liability awards for wrongful deaths,
Johnson & Johnson would have paid less than $2 mil
lion if it had been found liable for all seven deaths.
To its great credit, Johnson & Johnson's
response to the incident was in no way tentative. The
company firmly reestablished Tylenol's acceptance
among consumers by introducing a protective packag
ing system that created three barriers to potential
tampering-an approach that went well beyond that
imposed by the FDA regulation.
It is fair to ask, however, if the immense
cost of this effort, some $100 million, was strictly jus
tifiable in social terms. After all, there are many other
ways to spend $100 million that are likely to be more
effective in saving lives-improving guardrails on high
ways, for example. Moreover, society's interest in pre
serving Tylenol as a viable brand product, given avail
able substitutes, is not great, although the brand's
resurgence may well have discouraged other tamper
ing episodes. The huge amount by which the private,
market-based incentives for safety outweighed the
public and the regulatory incentives is notable.

July-August 1985

Reforming the regulatory
environment
To be effective, government policy in
safety-related matters must complement the forces of
the market rather than attempt to supplant them.
Properly structured, the penalties for noncompliance
with a government regulation ought to establish finan
cial incentives for safety much like those the market
generates.
Carefully drawn incentives foster rea
sonable trade-offs but not unreasonable and fantastical
ly expensive efforts to reduce all risks to zero or even,
as with EPA requirements for ambient air quality, to
allow for a "margin of safety" below the zero risk level.
Indeed, estimates of the price tag for risk and environ
mental policies proposed between 1975 and 1980 alone
ran from $370 billion to $1.1 trillion (1984 dollars).
The first necessary reform, then, is to
recognize that society has legitimate concerns other
than risk reduction and that regulatory policies do im
ply trade-offs among them. Ignoring this need for sensi
ble balance among competing goals may lead to even
riskier government policies. The FDA's pharmaceutical
testing program, for example, attempts to minimize
the risk of a potentially harmful drug going onto the
market. In its efforts to err on the side of caution, the
FDA incurs a substantial risk of a different type
namely, that a beneficial drug will reach the market
slowly or not at all. Some estimates of industry's fail
ure to gain early approval for beta blockers put the an
nual number of preventable deaths from cardiovascu
lar disease at 10,000.
Along with a more balanced regulatory
approach, there is a need for reform in policy design.
Federal agencies have, in effect, tried to dictate the
technological choices that companies should make. It
would be far more productive to give managers the lee
way to select the most cost-effective technologies with
which to satisfy the market's concern about risk reduc
tion. These choices can make a real financial differ
ence: engineering controls to reduce noise levels in the
workplace cost $119,000 per case of hearing loss pre
vented; protective devices that cut noise by the same
amount cost only $15,000 per worker protected.
Greater regulatory flexibility is also de
sirable. Experiments like the introduction of the EPA's
bubble policy remain the exception rather than the
norm. OSHA, for example, still imposes expensive re
quirements for machine guards that are so specific that
they pertain to only one-sixth of all machines. Presi
dent Ford's task force on OSHA tried to remedy these
deficiencies by establishing a model performance
oriented standard that gave managers a variety of op-

Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved.

137

Safety incentives

Exhibit I

Risk premiums as a percentage of total
earnings in manufacturing industries*

Risk premiums

Chemicals and allied products

of 3 %to 5 %

Petroleum refining and related industries

tions for reducing machine-related injuries. Not only
would the model standard have saved money; it would
also have extended the percentage of machines cov
ered. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, nothing came
of this measure.

Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies
Transportation equipment

Chemical labeling

Instruments and related products
Printing, publishing, and allied services
Tobacco manufacturers
Apparel and related products
Nonelectrical machinery
Risk premiums
of 6 % to 9 %

Textiles
Paper and allied products
Primary metals
Rubber and plastics
Fabricated metal products
Leather and leather products
Stone, clay, and glass products

Risk premiums

of12%to15 %

Food and allied products
Furniture and fixtures
Lumber and wood products
*These premiums are derived from
earnings equations that are estimates
of the relat ionship between injury rates
and workers' earnings.
From W. Kip Viscusi, Employment
Hazards: An Investigation of Market
Performance

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979);
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics injury<ate
data by industry.

Exhibit II

Workers' response to chemical labeling

Chemical label
Sodium
blear·
bonate

Chloroacetophenone

TNT

Asbestos

Change in
fraction who
consider job
above average
in risk

-35%

+45%

+63%

+58%

Annual wage
increase
demanded

$0

$ 1,900

$3,000

$5,200

Change in
fraction very
likely or
somewhat likely
to quit

-23 %

+13%

+52%

+63%

Source:

Data from Table 4 of
W. Kip Viscusi and Charles O'Connor,
"Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labelin9:
Are Workers Bay esian Decision Makers?'
American Economic Review,

December

1984, p. 949.

On balance, however, progress has been
made toward engaging market forces-especially the
force of better information-directly in the effort to
promote safety. The government has long used warning
on labels for cigarettes and pesticides as an alternative
to banning these risky products. Chief among the
newer uses of information is OSHA's chemical-labeling
policy, a prime example of how public policies might
be more effective if they took advantage of the con
structive role of the market.
With its price tag of $3 billion, OSHA's
hazard communication proposal is the most expensive
risk regulation the Reagan administration has issued.
Its goal is to place warning labels on containers of haz
ardous chemicals so that workers can take appropriate
precautionary action and companies can give prompt
and appropriate medical attention to individuals im
properly exposed to the chemicals. This approach rep
resents a dramatic shift in the tenor of OSHA policy. In
the past, if a hazardous substance was present in the
workplace, OSHA mandated that it be reduced to the
lowest technologically feasible level.
So uncompromising a policy is simply
untenable. Scientific evidence shows that more than
2,000 substances in the workplace are potentially car
cinogenic. If OSHA chose to control these substances
on a case-by-case basis, merely developing the regula
tions would take decades. Indeed, given OSHA's pace in
setting new health standards, the process might well
take several centuries. How much more sensible, then,
to use the risk-reducing capacity of workers' and man
agers' actions.
Companies in the petroleum and the
paint and coating industries, for example, have already
adopted such labeling programs to promote safety and
to cut product liability costs. Communicating infor
mation about potential hazards and suitable protective
equipment to workers will help them distinguish the
situations in which special care is necessary. Com
municating this information also has the benefit of
making the companies themselves aware of the haz
ards that these substances pose and is thus more likely
to promote the use of safe practices.
To investigate further how chemical
labeling influences the actions of workers, Charles
O' Connor (a chemical labeling consultant) and I con
ducted an experiment in which we monitored worker
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response at several plants to four different chemical la
bels. One of the chemicals was safe (sodium bicarbon
ate); the remaining three were risky (chloroacetophe
none, TNT, and asbestos). We showed each worker a
warning label for a chemical that would replace those
with which he or she was then working. As Exhibit II
indicates, the sodium bicarbonate label led workers to
believe that their jobs were below average in risk; the
others increased their perception of danger.
This kind of perceptual change helps in
crease the precautions workers take. It also leads to a
demand for higher pay-in our experiment, to demands
ranging from $1,900 to $5,200 annually. If workers
have long-term contracts and if job ratings change
slowly, wage pressure will not be the most immediate
expression of market forces. The market response will
show up first in quit behavior. If the asbestos workers
inpur study did not receive a boost in pay, almost two
thirds of them would be likely to leave their jobs in the
next year.
Policies like chemical labeling will
trigger various sorts of market forces-changes in risk
perception, safety precautions, demands for wage pre
miums, and worker turnover-and it is up to each com
pany to engage these forces in the most cost-effective
way to promote safety. OSHA underscores this flexibil
ity not by requiring a specific labeling format but by re
quiring companies to educate workers about chemical
hazards and to label all hazardous chemicals. Indus
tries that now have labeling programs, such as the
paint and coating industry, may continue to use them.
·

Performance-oriented and market-com
plementing regulation enlarges the role that business
can play in promoting safety at the same time that it
creates incentives for managers to understand the con
nection between the market's interest in safety and
profitability. The older standard-based and command
and-control approach has the reverse effect. Bicycles
meeting the regulations of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, for example, must bear a tag with
the statement, "Meets U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission regulations for bicycles/' and the label
must be "at least 6.4 cm (2.5 in.) by 17.8 cm17 in.J set
ting forth the required labeling statement legibly and
conspicuously in capital letters at least 0.6 cm (0.25 in.)
high." Such narrowly drawn policies ignore the con
structive possibilities of linking forces with the opera
tion of the market. Neither business nor society can
afford to maintain this sort of ignorance. �
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Politics & economics
...politics differs from economics in three important
respects.
First. politics concerns preferences that do not
always have a common monetary measuring rod. In
an economic market, we seek to maximize our "util
ity," a goal that substantively can be almost any
thing but in practice involves things that have, or
can easily be given, money values. We may wish to
be saints or sinners, to feed the poor or to indulge
our basest appetites; but so long as we do these
things by consuming more of something when its
(money) price goes down and consuming less of it
when its (money) price goes up, the economist is
indifferent to our ultimate purposes.
...As voters, bureaucrats, or legislators, we may wish
to regulate nuclear energy, provide more jobs for
the unemployed, reduce the foreign trade deficit,
curb inflation, and minimize the cost of government;
but we have no way of expressing our choices
among these partially competing goals in nonarbi
trary, quantitative terms .... Unlike the economic
market, where the observer can make the radical
but reasonable assumption that each person has
the same motive (rational wealth-maximization), in
the political arena the observer can note only that
each participant wants different things, and some
times several different things simultaneously, and
that each participant assigns a different but
impossible-to-quantify value to each goal....
Second, political action requires assembling major
ity coalitions to make decisions that bind everyone
whether or not he belongs to that coalition. When
we make purchases in a market, we commit only
ourselves, and we consume as much or as little of
a given product as we wish. When we participate
in making decisions in the political arena, we are
implicitly committing others as well as ourselves,
and we are "consuming" not only a known product
(such as the candidate for whom we vote) but also
a large number of unknown products (all the poli
cies the winning candidate will help enact)....
The third and most important difference between
economics and politics is that whereas economics
is based on the assumption that preferences are
given, politics must take into account the efforts
made to change preferences. Consumers have
"revealed preferences," the origin or value of which
is of little importance. What people want is thought
to arise from outside the market-to be "exoge
nous." Only how much they purchase is affected by
the market. But much, if not most, of politics con
sists of efforts to change wants by arguments, per
suasion, threats, bluffs, and education....

From
"The Polltics of Regulation,"
by James Q. Wilson
in The Politics of Regulation,
ed. James 0. Wilson
(New York: Basic Books, 1980),
pp. 362·363.
Reprinted with the permission
of the publisher.
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